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Accountants and the Securities Act *
By Spencer Gordon
The securities act of 1933 has already been the subject of wide 
discussion. Its provisions have been analyzed and its historical 
and philosophical basis expounded on many occasions. It has 
elicited vigorous criticism and equally vigorous defense.
But the articles that I have seen contain little mention of the 
duties and liabilities of accountants. We read at length of the 
effect of the act upon the financial interests and upon the public, 
but the difficulties imposed upon accountants are of too technical 
and special a nature to warrant extended mention in articles deal­
ing generally with the statute. In this address I shall direct 
myself particularly to the problems of accountants, the origin and 
extent of their responsibility, the defenses available to them in 
case of suit and the extent of their liability. I shall thus hope to 
avoid a repetition of much that has been ably said by others and 
to deal more thoroughly with the parts of the statute which have 
particular relation to the accounting profession.
When Responsibility Attaches
The statute provides for the registration of securities with the 
federal trade commission by the filing of “registration state­
ments” in regard to such securities.
No suit can be brought under the statute against an accountant 
as such unless he—
“. . . has with his consent been named as having prepared or 
certified any part of the registration statement, or as having pre­
pared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connec­
tion with the registration statement, ...” (Section 11 (a) (4).) 
See also section 7 in regard to filing the written consent of the 
accountant so named.
Extent of Responsibility
Section 11 (a) (4) provides for suits against an accountant 
only—
“. . . with respect to the statement in such registration state­
ment, report or valuation which purports to have been prepared 
or certified by him;”
*An address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants, at New 
Orleans, Oct. 17, 1933.
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The officers and directors of the issuing corporation who sign 
the registration statement and the directors upon whom liability 
is imposed by the act may be sued with respect to any part of the 
registration statement. The accountant, however, may be sued 
only with respect to the statement in such registration statement, 
report or valuation which purports to have been prepared or certi­
fied by him. He is not responsible for any other part of the 
registration statement.
Basis of Suit
Section 11 (a) provides for suit—
“ In case any part of the registration statement, when such part 
became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material 
fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated 
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mis­
leading, ...”
Section 8 provides that the effective date of a registration state­
ment shall be the twentieth day after the filing thereof, with 
certain exceptions and with further provisions relating to amend­
ments, inaccurate statements, etc. It is apparent that any 
attempt at literal enforcement of the provisions of section 11 (a) 
would create an impossible situation, in that, while provision 
may be made to insure the truth or untruth of statements when 
they are made or up to the time that a document containing such 
statements leaves the control of the maker, it is manifestly im­
possible for anyone except a prophet to make accurate statements 
of what facts will be twenty days later. This has resulted in the 
promulgation of article 15 of the commission’s regulations, which 
provides that the statement—
“shall be dated and shall state that such accountant . . . does 
believe at the time of the date of such certificate that the state­
ments therein are true . . .
“If anything comes to the attention of such accountant or 
other expert, or he obtains knowledge of any facts before the 
effective date of registration which would make any of the mate­
rial items therein untrue or indicate that there was an omission 
to state a material fact required to be stated or necessary to make 
the statements therein not misleading, he shall bring such im­
mediately to the attention of the commission.”
Volumes might be written as to what is “a material fact” 
within the meaning of section 11 (a). The American Law In­
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stitute has recently issued its Restatement of the Law of Contracts. 
In chapter 15 on fraud and misrepresentation this statement is 
made:
“Where a misrepresentation would be likely to affect the con­
duct of a reasonable man with reference to a transaction with 
another person, the misrepresentation is material . .
Relying on this definition I may venture to say that a “mate­
rial fact” within the meaning of this section 11 (a) is a fact the 
untrue statement or omission of which would be likely to affect 
the conduct of a reasonable man with reference to the acquisition, 
holding or disposal of the security in question.
The term “registration statement” is defined in section 2 (8) 
as including—
“. . . any amendment thereto and any report, document, or 
memorandum accompanying such statement or incorporated 
therein by reference.”
Thus any certificate, report and/or valuation accompanying the 
registration statement would be held a part thereof and might 
be the basis of a suit.
Who May Sue—Limitation—Waiver
Under section 11 (a)—
“. . . any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that 
at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omis­
sion) may . . . sue—.”
By section 2 (2) the word “person” is defined as including an 
individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint- 
stock company, a trust, any unincorporated organization or a 
government or political subdivision thereof. Suit may be brought 
under section 11 (a) not only by such a person acquiring the 
security at the time of the original offering to the public but by 
any such person who may acquire the security at any time there­
after—
“unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of 
such untruth or omission.”
In order to maintain such a suit the person acquiring the security 
does not have to show that he was misled by the incorrect state­
ment or omission, nor does he have to show that he relied on or 
even that he ever read the registration statement or any part of 
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it. Unless he actually knows of the untruth or omission, he may 
purchase the security blindly, and if he later discovers a material 
misstatement or omission in the registration statement he can 
take advantage of this as the basis for his suit. The statute places 
the burden on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff knew of 
the untruth or omission at the time he purchased the security. 
The plaintiff does not have to negative this as part of his affirma­
tive case. If, however, the defendant does prove such knowledge 
on the part of the plaintiff, it is a complete defense to the suit 
allowed by the act.
The only limitation on such a suit is contained in section 13 
providing that—
“No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created 
under section 11 . . . unless brought within two years after the 
discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such 
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence . . . In no event . . . more than ten years after the 
security was bona fide offered to the public.”
Section 14 provides that—
“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person 
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision 
of this title or of the rules and regulations of the commission 
shall be void.”
This probably invalidates only a condition, stipulation or 
provision which has been agreed to by the person acquiring the 
security in connection with such acquisition. It would hardly 
be held to mean that a competent person who had once acquired 
a security could not later, with full knowledge of the facts, give a 
release of liability or agree to any other condition, stipulation or 
provision.
Defenses
By section 11 (b) certain defenses are allowed, in addition to 
proof that the plaintiff at the time of the acquisition of the 
security knew of the untruth or omission:
“. . . that before the effective date of the part of the registra­
tion statement . . . (A) he had . . . ceased ... to act in 
every . . . relationship in which he was described in the registra­
tion statement as acting or agreeing to act, and (B) he had ad­
vised the commission and the issuer in writing that he had taken 
such action and that he would not be responsible for such part of 
the registration statement.” (Section 11 (b) (1).)
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While this provision seems to relate primarily to resignations 
by directors, etc., its language is broad enough to cover the case 
of the accountant. If an accountant gains any knowledge which 
makes him wish to repudiate the matter attributed to him before 
the effective date of the registration statement, he can do so and 
can escape liability by advising the commission and the issuer in 
writing that he has ceased to act in the relationship of accountant 
and that he will not be responsible for the part of the registration 
certificate attributed to him:
. that if such part of the registration statement became 
effective without his knowledge, upon becoming aware of such 
fact he forthwith acted and advised the commission, in accord­
ance with paragraph (1), and, in addition, gave reasonable public 
notice that such part of the registration statement had become 
effective without his knowledge;” (Section 11 (b) (2).)
In the case of the accountant it probably would be unusual for 
the part of the registration statement attributed to him to become 
effective without his knowledge, in view of the fact that his writ­
ten consent is required to be filed under section 7. But such a 
situation might arise, for example, where the accountant’s con­
sent had been 'forged or had been filed in violation of an agree­
ment to hold it pending further examination of some phase of the 
registration statement. In such case he may escape liability in 
the manner indicated:
“. . . as regards any part of the registration statement pur­
porting to be made upon his authority as an expert or purporting 
to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of himself as 
an expert, (i) he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable 
ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the 
registration statement became effective, that the statements 
therein were true and that there was no omission to state a mate­
rial fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the 
statements therein not misleading, or (ii) such part of the registra­
tion statement did not fairly represent his statement as an expert 
or was not a fair copy of or extract from his report or valuation as 
an expert;” (Section 11 (b) (3) (B).)
This provision deals with the situation which will usually be 
presented in a suit against an accountant and the defense which 
will usually be made. Whether or not such a defense will suc­
ceed will depend, not upon whether the accountant himself be­
lieved that he made a reasonable examination, but upon whether 
the court or the jury under directions from the court determines 
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that the examination was in fact reasonable in the light of all the 
evidence in the case. The accountant can testify as an expert as 
to what he believes is a reasonable investigation and what the 
practice of accountants is in that regard, and he can produce 
other accountants to give substantiating testimony, but all that 
will be admissible only as evidence of what in fact is a reasonable 
investigation. The same is true of the question of whether the 
accountant “had reasonable ground to believe and did believe.” 
Those are questions of fact. What the accountants may testify 
is admissible in evidence, but it is not conclusive.
Thus although the accountant involved may testify that he 
made what was in his opinion a reasonable investigation and that 
in his opinion he had reasonable ground to believe, and in fact did 
believe, that the statements were correct, nevertheless the court 
or jury, whichever has the duty of determining the facts in a 
particular case, may find from all the evidence that the accountant 
has not sustained the burden of proof upon any one or all of these 
points and that he has not established that he made reasonable 
investigation, that he had reasonable ground to believe and/or 
that he did in fact believe.
The defense that the part of the registration statement which 
is involved in the suit did not fairly represent the accountant’s 
statement as an expert or was not a fair copy of or an extract 
from his report or valuation as an expert is self-explanatory. 
Whether this defense has been established will also be a question 
of fact. Expert testimony will be desirable in many cases, but 
will not be conclusive:
“. . . as regards any part of the registration statement pur­
porting to be made on the authority of an expert (other than 
himself) or purporting to be a copy of or extract from a report or 
valuation of an expert (other than himself), he had reasonable 
ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the 
registration statement became effective, that the statements 
therein were true and that there was no omission to state a mate­
rial fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the 
statements therein not misleading, and that such part of the 
registration statement fairly represented the statement of the 
expert or was a fair copy of or extract from the report or valuation 
of the expert;” (Section 11 (b) (3) (C).)
The application of this subsection to the accountant appears to 
be as follows: Under section 11 (a) (4) he can be sued only with 
respect to matter which purports to have been prepared or certi- 
443
The Journal of Accountancy
fled by him. But in a balance-sheet or profit-and-loss statement 
certified by an accountant there may be items as to which he 
indicates that he in turn has relied upon another expert. As to 
such items, section 11 (b) (3) (C) is a defense if the accountant 
had reasonable ground to believe and in fact did believe that they 
were true, etc., and that they fairly represented the statement of 
the expert, etc.
. . as regards any part of the registration statement pur­
porting to be a statement made by an official person or purporting 
to be a copy of or extract from a public official document, he had 
reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such 
part of the registration statement became effective, that the 
statements therein were true, and that there was no omission to 
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading, and that such part 
of the registration statement fairly represented the statement 
made by the official person or was a fair copy of or extract from 
the public official document.” (Section 11 (b) (3) (D).)
Although this subsection would ordinarily be applicable to 
others than accountants, it is possible that the accountant’s 
certificate may in part purport to be a statement made by an 
official person or a copy of or extract from a public official docu­
ment. In such case the accountant will not be held for errors of 
fact in the statement or document if he had reasonable ground to 
believe and did believe that the statements were true, etc., and 
that the official statement or document was fairly represented in 
the registration statement.
As to each of these defenses the accountant is required to “sus­
tain the burden of proof” (Section 11 (b)). In a trial the burden 
of proof is ordinarily upon the plaintiff. In all suits brought 
under section 11 the plaintiff must therefore sustain the burden of 
proof that there has been, in the part of the registration statement 
attributed to the accountant, an untrue statement of a material 
fact or the omission to state a material fact required to be stated 
in the registration statement or necessary to make the statements 
therein not misleading, and the plaintiff must also sustain the 
burden of proof that he has acquired such security, and that the 
accountant has with his consent been named as having prepared 
or certified the statement which is the subject of the suit. If the 
plaintiff establishes these facts, the burden of proof is imposed on 
the defendant to establish the defenses allowed under section 11 
(b). The term “burden of proof” has been discussed in in­
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numerable cases. Perhaps as good a definition as can be found 
is contained in the old New Hampshire case of Lisbon v. Lyman, 
49 N. H. 553, 563, where Chief Justice Doe said:
“The burden of proof (in this case on the subject of emancipa­
tion) was on the plaintiff; and this burden was not sustained, 
unless the plaintiff proved it by a preponderance of all the evi­
dence introduced on the subject. But it was not necessary for 
the plaintiff to produce anything more than the slightest pre­
ponderance . . . Before any evidence was introduced, the scales 
in which the jury were to weigh the evidence were exactly bal­
anced ; if they remained so after all the evidence was introduced, 
emancipation was not proved; if they tipped ever so little, in 
favor of the plaintiff, emancipation was proved.”
Standard of Reasonableness
Section 11 (c) provides:
“ In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (3) of subsection 
(b) of this section, what constitutes reasonable investigation 
and reasonable ground for belief, the standard of reasonable­
ness shall be that required of a person occupying a fiduciary 
relationship.”
Broadly speaking, a person occupying a fiduciary relationship 
is in the position of a trustee, and the duties of trustees have 
often been the subject of judicial expression. In tentative draft 
No. 2 of the American Law Institute’s restatement of the law of 
trusts, section 169, the following appears:
“The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering 
the trust to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary pru­
dence would exercise in dealing with his own property; and if the 
trustee has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, 
he is under a duty to exercise such skill as he has.
“Comments:
“a. The standard of care and skill required of a trustee is the 
external standard of a man of ordinary prudence in dealing with 
his own property. A trustee is liable for a loss resulting from his 
failure to use the care and skill of a man of ordinary prudence, 
although he may have exercised all the care and skill of which he 
was capable.
*****
“b. Whether the trustee is prudent in the doing of an act 
depends upon the circumstances as they reasonably appear to 
him at the time when he does the act and not at some subsequent 
time when his conduct is called in question.”
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In the conference report on the securities act of 1933, H. R. report 
No. 152, 73rd congress, 1st session, appears the following:
"The standard by which reasonable care was exemplified was 
expressed in terms of the fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary 
under the law is bound to exercise diligence of a type commen­
surate with the confidence, both as to integrity and competence, 
that is placed in him. This does not, of course, necessitate that 
he shall individually perform every duty imposed upon him. 
Delegation to others of the performance of acts which it is un­
reasonable to require that the fiduciary shall personally perform 
is permissible. Especially is this true where the character of the 
acts involves professional skill or facilities not possessed by the 
fiduciary himself. In such cases reliance by the fiduciary, if his 
reliance is reasonable in the light of all the circumstances, is a 
full discharge of his responsibilities.”
Section 11 (c) is, however, a very difficult section to construe in 
its relation to the accountant, because we have had no previous ex­
perience of an accountant as such acting in a fiduciary relationship.
"The performance of the duties of a trustee requires the exer­
cise of a high degree of fidelity, vigilance and ability. Especially 
is this true when the trustee is a company organized for the pur­
pose of caring for trust estates, which holds itself out as possessing 
a special skill in the performance of the duties of a trustee, and 
which makes a charge for its services which adequately com­
pensates it for a high degree of fidelity and ability in the ad­
ministration of a trust estate.”—Estate of Allis, 191 Wis. 23.
As the accountant holds himself out as possessing a special 
skill in the performance of his duties, and as he performs these 
duties for compensation, if he is to be held to the standard of per­
sons occupying a fiduciary relationship he must exercise a high 
degree of fidelity, vigilance and ability. Until the section in 
question has been construed by the courts, I can only say that it 
seems to increase the measure of precaution that the accountant 
must exercise to fulfill his duty of reasonable care. He should 
approach his work as though he were auditing a transaction 
involving the funds of a widow or minor child for whom he is the 
guardian or trustee.
Extent of Liability
Section 11 further provides:
" (e) The suit authorized under subsection (a) may be either 
(1) to recover the consideration paid for such security with in­
terest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, 
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upon the tender of such security, (2) or for damages if the person 
suing no longer owns the security.”
The first branch of this subsection contemplates a suit brought 
by a person still holding the security. Upon tender of the security 
to the person sued, he may recover the consideration paid, 
with interest from date of payment, less the amount of any 
dividends or other income received from the security. There is 
no requirement that the plaintiff be one who acquired the stock 
at the original offering. Any subsequent purchaser still holding 
the security may sue under the section.
The liability thus imposed upon the accountant may be largely 
unrelated to and greatly in excess of any damage caused by the 
accountant’s error. For example, in a $1,000,000 stock issue, 
the accountant may have made an untrue statement of a material 
fact by omitting to mention liabilities of $100,000, which in the 
average case would presumably have affected the value of the 
securities, when issued, to the extent of ten per cent. By reason 
of ensuing business conditions the stock which sold for $1,000,000, 
and in the average case should have sold for $900,000, had the 
accountant been correct in his statement, may fall on the stock 
exchange to a total value of $100,000, the stock which was issued 
at 100 then selling at 10. In this situation the holders of the 
stock may tender it to the accountant and require him to pay the 
consideration that they have given for it with the adjustments 
heretofore mentioned, so that if all the original purchasers still 
have their stock the accountant will have to pay approximately 
$1,000,000 and will receive stock worth only $100,000, a net 
penalty to the accountant of $900,000, although his error only 
affected the stock to the extent of $100,000.
The second branch of the subsection allowing “damages if the 
person suing no longer owns the security” apparently does not 
impose as clear a liability as the recovery of consideration ex­
pressly provided in section 11 (e) (1). In order to be consistent 
with that section, we should expect a provision somewhat as 
follows:
“or (2) to recover damages, equal to the consideration paid for 
such security with interest thereon, less the amount received for 
the security and any income received thereon, if the person suing 
no longer owns the security.”
This would have placed the person who no longer owns the 
security in the same position as to ability to recover damages as 
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the person who still holds the security. But the act does not so 
provide, and, if this ambiguity is not obviated by subsequent 
legislation, it may be held, in a suit by a person who no longer 
owns the security, that only real damages can be recovered—that 
is, damages which are the natural result of the untrue statement 
or of the omission and can be traced to the error of the accountant. 
In the absence of clear language imposing such a liability, the 
courts should be slow to give "damages” which are caused by 
subsequent economic and market conditions and are not caused 
by the act of the person sued.
It is interesting to note, however, that Felix Frankfurter, a 
distinguished lawyer who is reputed to be one of the authors of 
the act, in an article in Fortune for August, 1933, seems to con­
sider that the damages will include the full loss to the investor 
whether caused by the accountant’s error or by subsequent events. 
His article states in part:
“When circumstances permit suit, the investor, on tender of 
the security, may recover the consideration he paid, or damages if 
he has parted with the security. Since the remedy is in the 
nature of a rescission, it avoids the inquiry, practically impossible, 
as to the extent of the damages due to the misrepresentation and 
the extent due to other causes. To force the injured party to 
disentangle these items of damage would impose upon him an 
unfair burden in litigation. Where a material misrepresentation 
has been made, it is not for those who have been guilty of bad 
faith or incompetence or recklessness to put the buyer to proof 
that his bargain was not bad for still other causes.”
Section 11 contains a further provision:
“ (g) In no case shall the amount recoverable under this section 
exceed the price at which the security was offered to the public.”
The effect of this provision in a suit under section 11 (e) (1) is 
reasonably clear. Such a suit is to recover the consideration paid 
for the security with interest thereon, less the amount of any 
income received therefrom, upon the tender of such security. 
Under section 11 (g) if the consideration paid, with the adjust­
ments provided, is greater than the price at which the security 
was offered to the public, the amount recoverable under section 
11 (e) (1) is reduced to such price.
But when we attempt to determine the effect of section 11 (g) 
on suits for damages under section 11 (e) (2) if the person suing 
no longer owns the security, a difficult question is presented. If 
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the courts hold that the damages recoverable are only such dam­
ages as are the natural result of the untrue statement or of the 
omission, there would appear to be no reason for the application 
of section 11 (g) in a section 11 (e) (2) case, as such damages could 
hardly exceed the price at which the security was offered to the 
public. But if the courts hold that the remedy of damages given 
by section 11 (e) (2) should be construed in such a way that the 
person who has parted with the security has a remedy equivalent 
to the remedy of recovery of consideration expressly given by sec­
tion 11 (e) (1) to the person who still holds the security, then 
section 11 (g) may affect such a suit for damages in either of two 
ways, depending on whether the courts attempt to give a con­
struction which will make the section consistent or whether they 
follow the literal words of section 11 (g).
1. In order to make the remedies provided by section 11 (e) 
(1) and 11 (e) (2) entirely consistent, section 11 (g) should be 
construed to mean that in a suit for damages the measure of 
recovery shall be based not upon the consideration actually paid for 
the security but upon the price at which the security was offered 
to the public if that was less than the consideration paid. Such a 
construction would make section 11 (e) (1) and (2) and section 11 
(g) consistent with the express provisions of section 11 (e) (1) and 
with the clear application of section 11 (g) to section 11 (e) (1).
2. If, however, section 11 (g) is construed literally, the only 
provision we find is that the amount recoverable shall not exceed 
“the price at which the security was offered to the public,” and 
under a literal construction there is apparently no limit to the 
possible liability. For example, a security might be offered to 
the public at 100, subsequently purchased by the plaintiff at 200 
and sold again at 100. The 100 lost by that particular plaintiff 
would not exceed the price at which the security was offered to 
the public. In the case of a fluctuating security with an active 
market there may be an infinite number of such purchasers who 
have sustained such losses, in each case up to but not beyond the 
price at which the security was originally offered to the public. 
As the same share of stock may be sold again and again as the 
quotations go up and down, the total of these losses may be more 
than the total amount at which the issue was originally sold to 
the public and may in fact be infinite in amount. Although this 
construction must be recognized as a possibility, I think that it is 
improbable that the courts will so hold, because it involves the 
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reading of language into section 11 (e) (2) to make it harmonize 
with section 11 (e) (1), but the refusal to continue the harmonizing 
process by reading anything into section 11 (g).
Other Remedies Reserved
By section 16 it is provided:
“The rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in ad­
dition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at 
law or in equity.”
In Ultramares Corporation v. Touche et al., 255 N. Y. 170, it 
was held that an accountant was liable for negligence only to one 
with whom he was in privity of contract, but that his liability for 
fraud ran to any person injured by such fraud, and there might 
be negligence so gross as to be evidence of fraud. Not involved in 
this case, but well established at common law, are the principles 
that the injury must be caused by a reliance on the act of the 
accountant, and that the damages recoverable must be the nat­
ural consequence of the accountant’s negligence or fraud.
Under the securities act of 1933, in regard to the parts of the 
registration statement attributed to the accountant, with his 
consent, the accountant’s liability is greatly broadened:
1. As to the persons who may recover in cases other than those 
of fraud: They need have no contractual relationship with the 
accountant.
2. As to the injury: This may be caused in part by events other 
than the negligence or fraud of the accountant.
3. As to the amount of the damage recoverable: This has been 
increased by section 11 (e) (1) and perhaps by section 11 (e) (2).
And “all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in 
equity” remain.
Conclusion
In the provisions of the securities act of 1933 and in the author­
ities that I have given in support of the views expressed in 
this address, there has been much use of the word “reasonable,” 
“reasonable investigation,” “reasonable ground to believe,” 
“circumstances as they reasonably appear,” “the conduct of a 
reasonable man.” Perhaps one may think that I should have 
discussed these expressions and should have explained their 
meaning, but it seemed to me that it would be more appropriate 
to do this in one place and at the conclusion of my address.
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The best definition that I have ever seen of the reasonable man 
is contained in a volume entitled Misleading Cases in the Common 
Law by A. P. Herbert. I quote from the judgment of Lord Jus­
tice Morrow in Fardell v. Potts, at page 12:
“The common law of England has been laboriously built about 
a mythical figure—the figure of ‘the reasonable man.’ . . . He 
is an ideal, a standard, the embodiment of all those qualities 
which we demand of the good citizen. . . .
“. . . It is impossible to travel anywhere or to travel for long 
in that confusing forest of learned judgments which constitutes 
the common law of England without encountering the reasonable 
man. . . . There has never been a problem, however difficult, 
which his majesty’s judges have not in the end been able to resolve 
by asking themselves the simple question, ‘Was this or was it not 
the conduct of a reasonable man? ’ and leaving that question to be 
answered by the jury.
“. . . The reasonable man is always thinking of others; pru­
dence is his guide, . . . He is one who invariably looks where 
he is going and is careful to examine the immediate foreground 
before he executes a leap or a bound; who neither star-gazes nor 
is lost in meditation when approaching trapdoors or the margin of 
a dock; . . . who never mounts a moving omnibus and does not 
alight from any car while the train is in motion; who investigates 
exhaustively the bona fides of every mendicant before distributing 
alms and will inform himself of the history and habits of a dog 
before administering a caress; who believes no gossip, nor repeats 
it, without firm basis for believing it to be true; who never drives 
his ball till those in front of him have definitely vacated the 
putting-green which is his own objective; who never from one 
year’s end to another makes an excessive demand upon his wife, 
his neighbors, his servants, his ox or his ass; who in the way of 
business looks only for that narrow margin of profit which twelve 
men such as himself would reckon to be ‘fair,’ and contemplates 
his fellow-merchants, their agents, and their goods with that 
degree of suspicion and distrust which the law deems admirable; 
who never swears, gambles or loses his temper; who uses nothing 
except in moderation and even while he flogs his child is meditat­
ing only on the golden mean.
“ Devoid, in short, of any human weakness, with not one single 
saving vice, sans prejudice, procrastination, ill-nature, avarice 
and absence of mind, as careful for his own safety as he is for 
that of others, this excellent but odious character stands like a 
monument in our courts of justice, vainly appealing to his fellow­
citizens to order their lives after his own example.’’
I leave you with this definition and with the juries which will 
be duly empaneled to try any suits arising under the securities act 
of 1933.
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